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1. The Significance of Group Trustworthiness 
We value trustworthiness where we find it, in friends, colleagues, and strangers. This is 
because it is easier to cooperate with trustworthy individuals than with untrustworthy ones, 
but also because trustworthiness is appreciated for its own sake. Conversely, we resent 
untrustworthiness when we encounter it, and try to minimise interaction with untrustworthy 
individuals.  This preference for trustworthiness over untrustworthiness is not limited to our 
interactions with individuals.  Who wouldn’t prefer to work for a trustworthy company, to be 
treated at a trustworthy hospital, and to vote for a trustworthy political party?   
 
The trustworthiness of collective entities is central to much public discourse around trust and 
distrust.  A collapse of trust in bankers, say, is not merely a collapse of trust in individual, 
identifiable bankers, but takes in the profession as a whole; moreover, a collapse of trust in 
bankers goes hand-in-hand with a collapse of trust in the banks (de Bruin 2015).  Likewise, 
discussion of trust or distrust in corporations, governments, news organisations, or even 
brands seems to concern collective entities of various kinds. 
 
Unsurprisingly, then, trust and trustworthiness in collective contexts are widely discussed by 
social scientists.  For example, in international relations there is debate about trust and 
distrust between states, other organisations or groups, and individual representatives of those 
collectives (e.g. Booth and Wheeler (2008)).  And ‘organizational trust’ is a recognised 
research topic in management studies, taking in not only corporations, but also 
nongovernmental organisations and other complex group agents. Such research investigates 
both the influence of organisational contexts on our trust in individuals, and the ways in 
which trust is invested in organisations themselves (e.g. Saunders, Skinner, et al 2010).   
 
If philosophers are to contribute to public discussions or to interdisciplinary dialogue, we 
need to understand how our own accounts of trust and trustworthiness can be applied in such 
contexts (Mäkelä and Townley 2013 make a related point). Moreover, an investigation of 
trust and trustworthiness in collective contexts promises to improve our understanding of 
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collective agency, intentionality, responsibility, belief, and knowledge; issues of trust span 
the theoretical-practical divide, often in distinctive and interesting ways.    
 
But philosophers’ accounts are typically focused on issues of trust in individuals, aiming to 
capture the nature of this attitude, the circumstances under which it may be rational, and the 
notion of trustworthiness which corresponds to this attitude of individual trust.  (There are 
important exceptions to this individualistic rule; I return to some of these below.)  In 
particular, philosophers often distinguish trusting someone from merely relying upon her, 
then theorise this distinction. Reliance is an attitude we may adopt towards inanimate objects: 
we rely upon the tent to keep us warm and dry overnight. Trust is usually taken to include 
reliance plus some further factor. This respects Annette Baier’s insight (1986) that trust is 
distinctively connected with the possibility of betrayal and resentment, unlike ‘mere’ 
reliance: if the tent leaks, we should not resent the tent itself, though we might resent the 
person who promised to mend the tent before we set out.  In (Hawley 2014) I argued that we 
should also distinguish distrust from mere absence of reliance, and moreover that we should 
not neglect the many interactions with other people in which either reliance or nonreliance is 
appropriate, but neither trust nor distrust is appropriate.   
 
What is the magic ingredient which distinguishes (dis)trust from mere (non)reliance?  
Philosophers, inevitably, disagree: perhaps a truster imputes appropriate motives to the 
trustee, including perhaps a concern with or responsiveness to the needs, desires or indeed 
trust of the truster; perhaps a truster sees a trustee as morally obligated, committed, or 
accountable in appropriate ways (Simon (2013) is an excellent bibliographical guide). Across 
this variety of accounts, trust is understood to be directed at agents, or at persons, or in a 
distinctively second-personal fashion, or as an aspect of the participant stance: it is always a 
mistake to trust a tent, a trout, or a turkey, although we may rely upon such things. This 
emphasis on the interpersonal flows from the way in which the trust-reliance distinction is 
identified via the connection between trust and the reactive attitudes around betrayal. Not 
every interpersonal interaction is characterised by either trust or distrust, but every proper 
attitude of trust or distrust is directed interpersonally. Or so it seems. 
 
Thus it is no accident that within this philosophical paradigm we rarely discuss trust or 
distrust as directed towards collective entities, since even the most inflationary accounts of 
collective agency hold back from treating such entities as full-fledged persons in every 
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respect, on a par with individual human persons.  (To date, not even Mitt Romney has 
advocated corporate suffrage.)  Given that we need a philosophical understanding of trust in 
collectives, how then should we proceed? 
 
One strategy would be to consider various accounts of individual trust and trustworthiness 
pairwise with accounts of collective agency, responsibility, and so on, looking for rewarding 
and plausible combinations. This is a valuable project, which I do not pursue here. Another 
strategy would be to address collective issues on their own terms, without expecting to find 
much commonality between inter-personal trust and trust at the collective level. Baier (2013: 
175-6), for example, is explicit that her account of interpersonal trust, in terms of 
vulnerability, competence, and goodwill, cannot easily encompass trust in organisations. We 
might hazard that accounts of trust which emphasise mutuality, emotional affect, and 
complex relationships will in general not apply to more distant forms of trust, including trust 
in collective entities; advocates of such accounts might see this as a strength, arguing that it 
would be a mistake to collapse such different attitudes. 
 
In this paper, I adopt a different strategy, one which may complement either of the first two 
projects: I examine the costs of abandoning the trust-reliance distinction in collective 
contexts.  Vindicating this distinction has been regarded as an essential criterion of success 
for accounts of trust in individuals.  But, I will argue, we can explain and justify much of our 
practices around groups without using this distinction; the costs of abandoning it are low, as 
compared to the individual case. 
 
Supposing my arguments are persuasive: what then?  The fact that we can manage without 
this distinction does not entail that there is in reality no distinction between group 
trustworthiness and group reliability.  For example, we might on closer investigation decide 
to adopt accounts of individual trust, and of collective belief, intention, and responsibility 
which together entail that groups can after all be trustworthy in the same way that individuals 
can be trustworthy; nothing I say in this paper will rule out that possibility.   
 
However, if the costs of doing without the distinction are low, then we cannot use the 
supposed importance of the distinction as a consideration when deciding between different 
accounts of groups.  Thus it is not a constraint on an adequate theory of groups that groups be 
capable of trustworthiness as opposed to mere reliability.  A strong reading of my project is 
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that we should stop thinking in terms of either group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in 
groups.  This might seem to spell disaster for the project of philosophical engagement with 
public and cross-disciplinary discussion of organisational trust.  I reflect upon this challenge 
at the end of the paper, and gesture at a more optimistic way forward.  
 
2. Groups, Organisations, Institutions 
First, however, a note on terminology. Within philosophy, the term ‘group’ is a catch-all label 
for a great variety of candidate collective agents.  For example, Frederick Schmitt’s ‘The 
Justification of Group Belief’ (1994) begins with examples such as ‘the Engineering Division 
of the Ford Motor Corporation’, ‘the crowd that had assembled on the square’, and ‘This 
Court’.  Deborah Tollefsen’s ‘Group Deliberation….’ (2004) focuses on small teams of 
scientists. Kay Mathieson’s ‘The Epistemic Features of Group Belief’ (2006) focuses on 
groups identified by listing their members.  In her ‘Group Testimony…’, Miranda Fricker 
mentions committees, news teams, governments, research groups, and consultancies (2009: 
272).  The cover blurb for List and Pettit’s Group Agency (2011) begins with companies, 
churches and states.  All of these philosophers are sensitive to the differences between 
various types of collective entity, but use ‘group’ as the general term. 
 
The situation is different within the social sciences.  For example, Piotr Sztompka’s 
influential Trust: A Sociological Theory (1999: ch.3) distinguishes ‘social categories’, such as 
gender, age, and race, from ‘social groups’ such as the football club Real Madrid, a class of 
students, or an army platoon, and from ‘institutions and organizations’ such as the university, 
the army, the courts, and the banks.  Sztompka goes on to discuss technological systems, food 
products, and general social systems such as democracy as objects of trust or distrust.  It is 
hard for a novice to disentangle the relevant terminology, and harder still to map these 
distinctions onto those which typically interest philosophers. (I take consolation from 
economist Geoffrey Hodgson’s remark: ‘…endless disputes over the definitions of key terms 
such as institution and organization have led some writers to give up matters of definition 
and to propose getting down somehow to practical matters instead.’ (2006: 1))   
 
I will stick with the philosophical usage of ‘group’, as a general term for all sorts of candidate 
collective agents.  But we should bear in mind the variety of social entities which might be 
considered the object of trust or distrust, and the potential obstacles to communication across 




3. Trust, Trustworthiness, and Reliability 
So, do we need a distinction between trust and reliance with respect to groups? I will 
approach this via a related question: do we need to distinguish group trustworthiness from 
group reliability?  Trust and trustworthiness are closely entwined, of course: very roughly, to 
be trustworthy is to merit the attitude of trust, and to trust is to regard as trustworthy. But it is 
useful to begin with trustworthiness, for several reasons.  In my opinion, trustworthiness is 
the primary site of moral evaluation in this area, though I cannot defend that position here.  
More pragmatically, there is very likely some confusion in our actual attitudes of trust and 
distrust towards groups.  To understand whether our attitudes of trust and distrust are 
coherent, it is helpful to understand the features of groups – trustworthiness and 
untrustworthiness – which the attitudes target.  Jones (2012) demonstrates the fruitfulness of 
exploring trustworthiness first, and I hope that the viability of this approach is further 
demonstrated in the present chapter. 
 
This trustworthiness-first approach does not assume that only trustworthiness can justify 
trusting (hence my ‘very roughly’ above). There can be many reasons to trust in the absence 
of trustworthiness, including therapeutic trust aimed at cultivating trustworthiness, 
psychological self-protection, efficiency in low-risk situations, and so on.  Nevertheless, even 
in such cases, trusting involves behaving as if the recipient were trustworthy.  Moreover, we 
can approach theorising trustworthiness-first without making substantive commitments about 
how best to cultivate stronger trust relationships in society (Baier (2013); O’Neill (2013)).     
 
Trustworthiness is to be distinguished from mere reliability. Circumstances under which 
either trust or distrust is appropriate, as opposed to mere reliance or nonreliance, are 
circumstances under which the actor’s trustworthiness is tested.  Many intentional actions fall 
outside the scope of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, especially where they seem 
independent of obligations to others. The headteacher at the school next door regularly 
releases noisy children into the yard at midday, and I rely upon this to remind me to take a 
lunch break. But the headteacher’s reliability in this matter is not an issue of trust or distrust 





We do not mark the trust-reliance distinction sharply in everyday language, and nor do we 
mark the trustworthiness-reliability distinction consistently. This everyday loose talk presents 
a problem to the theorist who hopes to explain the underlying differences between 
trustworthiness and reliability.  Which cases are which?  Exactly what are we trying to 
account for? 
 
Despite these difficulties, the distinction between trustworthiness and mere reliability for 
individuals is worth investigating because it is morally significant.  Trustworthiness is an 
admirable character trait, something to aspire to and inculcate in one’s children, whereas 
mere reliability may have practical value but does not seem valuable for its own sake.  As 
individuals, it is important for us to understand the difference between circumstances under 
which our behaviour is a test of our trustworthiness, and circumstances under which it is 
merely a sign of our predictability or reliability. There are indeed plenty of borderline cases, 
but there are also plenty of clear cases to work with.   
 
The problem of distinguishing trustworthiness and reliability is all the more difficult in 
collective cases.  Recall the variety of social entities which are spoken about in terms of trust 
and distrust: is a trustworthy corporation or political system trustworthy in anything like the 
same way that a spouse or friend can be trustworthy, or is such impersonal trustworthiness 
more like the reliability of a well-made car?  Regarding individuals, it is worth persevering 
with the trustworthiness-reliability distinction.  But what about groups?  Do we need a 
morally-laden notion of trustworthiness for collective entities, or can we get by with mere 
reliability and unreliability? 
 
4. Group Reliability? 
Ideally, I would now propose a detailed account of group reliability, then investigate whether 
any additional notion of group trustworthiness is both coherent and valuable. Less than 
ideally, I will simply take it that we have some grasp of reliability and unreliability as these 
apply to groups.  But a few points are worth making. 
 
Both reliance and reliability can be differentiated with reference to tasks or domains. I rely on 
my alarm clock to wake me up, but I do not rely on it to pass unqueried through airport 
security.  I rely upon my dog to behave sensibly in public (in a somewhat unspecified way), 
but I do not rely upon her to stay off the furniture. At the limit, reliability in a very specific 
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respect can be identified with success in a one-off task. I relied upon my alarm clock to wake 
me up today at 7am, it did so, and it was thus reliable in that particular respect, even if, over 
the course of several days, it proves to be more generally unreliable, and thus useless as an 
alarm clock.  This generalising move can be understood statistically, or in terms of 
dispositions, or ceteris paribus clauses.  As is familiar from the epistemological literature on 
the ‘generality problem’ for reliabilism, the range or comparison class can make a big 
difference to judgements of reliability (e.g. Bonjour (2002)).  As is obvious from everyday 
life, reliability can come in degrees.  
 
What about group reliability or unreliability?  Sometimes when we talk of a group of people 
as reliable, we simply mean that all or most people in that group are reliable in the relevant 
respect, or perhaps, via a generic, that ‘normal’ members of the group are reliable.  For 
example, my students can be relied upon to bring their textbooks to class, and I plan our 
activities on that basis; the group is reliable in this respect because enough individual group 
members are reliable. Sometimes, such judgements about individuals are based on their group 
membership, for better or for worse. 
 
In this paper, I will set aside this type of group reliability, focusing instead upon situations in 
which the group as a whole acts, and is reliable or unreliable in doing so.  We might see 
bringing-their-textbooks-to-class as a kind of group action: this is something the students do 
together, simply in virtue of each individual bringing his or her textbook to class. But many 
interesting group actions stand in more complex relationships to the actions of individual 
group members.  For example, the students create a relaxed environment in class, occupy all 
the seats, and disagree about the nature of free will.  I will not attempt to specify the range of 
possible group actions, nor to engage with the rich, extensive literature on collective or group 
agency (e.g. List and Pettit 2012).  My task in this paper is to investigate whether we need to 
think of groups as trustworthy actors, or merely as reliable actors.  Thus I need to assume that 
groups can act, reliably or unreliably.   
 
Trustworthiness can be discussed both in the context of practical action, and in the context of 
testimony: we trust people to do stuff, and we trust people to speak truthfully.  Such 
discussions are enriched when they are integrated with one another.  Speaking truthfully is a 
kind of action, and moreover trusting people to do stuff often involves trusting them to follow 
through on their words.  Nevertheless, trust in testimony does have some distinctive features 
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which merit special attention.  Moreover, there is a small but valuable recent literature on 
group testimony, so I will begin my discussion with testimony. 
 
5. Trustworthiness and Individual Testimony 
There is much we might hope for when others speak.  Embarrassingly often, we just hope to 
be entertained, and on this front we can distinguish someone who is reliably entertaining 
from someone who can be trusted to be entertaining.  For example, someone who is often 
unintentionally entertaining is reliable in this respect, but not trustworthy. 
 
More soberly, we might hope to learn something when others speak – appreciating what 
others say is a key source of true beliefs. An individual can serve as a reliable guide to the 
truth in all sorts of ways.  Someone with an open countenance reliably reveals her thoughts 
via blushing or other ‘tells’, whilst someone else’s eye-bags provide information about her 
recent lifestyle.  Verbal behaviour can also reliably indicate the truth. For example, the 
questions I ask reveal my preoccupations, my strenuous denial of interest in some topic 
suggests quite the opposite, and what I say in my sleep indicates my true fears. 
 
This type of reliable openness or readability does not amount to trustworthiness. Why not? A 
full answer would involve a substantive, and therefore controversial, account of the 
difference between trust and reliance. But the short answer is that unreliability in these 
respects does not constitute a betrayal, we do not in general owe such reliability to others, and 
others are not entitled to resent us if we lack such reliability.  That is, one can be unreliable in 
these ways without being untrustworthy. If I can dance the night away and still look fresh in 
the morning, this does not make me untrustworthy; likewise if I rarely blush, talk only 
nonsense in my sleep, and ask questions in a neutral manner.  Such traits help me to mislead 
others if I wish to, and can thereby facilitate untrustworthiness.  But unreadability does not 
constitute untrustworthiness in its own right. 
 
In contrast, in core cases of testimony where an individual asserts something to an audience – 
or, if you prefer, where an individual tells an audience something – reliability with regard to 
truth-indication does constitute trustworthiness. As elsewhere, the notion of reliability here is 
very rough-and-ready.  Reliability comes in degrees; moreover we should distinguish 
between reliability on a given occasion, reliability across a subject matter, and reliability 
quite generally.  My main purpose here is to contrast reliability with trustworthiness, and 
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individual with group cases: we do not need a full understanding of reliability in order to 
make some comparative judgements. 
 
But however we understand reliability, reliability in assertion (or telling) is a matter of 
trustworthiness, because assertion involves undertaking responsibility for what is said.  In 
contrast, speaking truthfully or falsely in one’s sleep does not contribute to either 
trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, because we do not hold people responsible for sleep 
talk.  This aspect of assertion is acknowledged by a wide range of philosophers who 
otherwise take quite different views of what assertion involves.  For Peirce, ‘to assert a 
proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth’ (1932: 384).  For Searle an assertion 
of p ‘counts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an actual state of affairs’ (1969: 
66).  And for Williamson, ‘To make an assertion is to confer a responsibility (on oneself) for 
the truth of its content’ (2000: 268-9).   
 
More ambitiously, Brandom (1983) argues that asserting that p involves commitment to 
withdrawing the assertion if it proves to be mistaken, and/or to defending the assertion 
against reasonable challenges.  Such commitments last beyond the moment of assertion itself.  
But one can recognise that assertion involves an undertaking of responsibility without 
recognising any such longer-lasting commitments: this is illustrated by the quotation from 
Williamson above, which comes just a few pages after he explicitly rejects Brandom’s 
account.  Williamson goes on to say that one discharges this responsibility ‘by epistemically 
ensuring the truth of the content’ (2000: 269), i.e. by satisfying the condition that one knows 
what one asserts, at the moment of assertion.  This encapsulates Williamson’s preferred 
‘knowledge norm’ on assertion, but those who prefer other norms – perhaps a truth norm, or a 
justified-to-believe norm – can also cast these in terms of discharging one’s responsibility as 
an assertor. 
 
So I will take it that, in the individual case, reliability or unreliability in the provision of 
(apparent) information becomes a matter of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness when the 
individual makes an assertion, or tells an audience something, thus somehow taking 
responsibility for what is said.  Can we apply these ideas to collective entities? 
 
6. What is Group Testimony? 
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What is it for a group to be reliable as a guide to the truth?  We can often obtain information 
by observing the behaviour of groups of people: if the crowd is gathered around laughing, I 
infer that there is something funny going on.  Sometimes we obtain information from the 
verbal behaviour of a group.  Surowiecki (2004) illustrates the ‘wisdom of crowds’ with a 
phenomenon noted by Francis Galton: when a large number of people at a country fair were 
asked to estimate the weight of an ox, the average estimate was very accurate, indeed more 
accurate than the estimates of individual experts.   
 
Interesting and useful though this phenomenon is, it does not involve group assertion, or 
anything which involves trustworthiness as opposed to mere reliability.  Neither the crowd 
collectively nor any individual member of the crowd can sensibly be held accountable for the 
accuracy of the average estimate; neither the crowd nor any individual takes responsibility for 
the truth of the average judgement.   
 
In other circumstances, however, a group or organisation produces something which looks 
much more like assertion or testimony.  Seemingly just as an individual may express herself 
by employing a spokesperson, issuing a written statement, or speaking in the ordinary way, a 
group may issue a statement via a spokesperson, or publish a report with the group’s 
imprimatur. Not all groups are capable of doing this: issuing a statement or report seems to 
require a certain degree of internal structure and organisation. Moreover it is sometimes 
unclear whether an individual is authorised to speak on behalf of a group: consider how 
journalists turn to informal ‘community leaders’ to represent the collective view.   
 
Nevertheless, we often understand groups or collective entities as issuing statements in these 
ways.  This might suggest that we need to distinguish the trustworthiness of a group, with 
respect to its assertions or testimony, from the mere reliability we see in ‘wisdom of crowds’ 
cases.  Does this provide a clear case of group trustworthiness as something over and above 
group reliability? 
 
Jennifer Lackey (2014) argues that, when a group ‘speaks through’ a spokesperson, the 
group’s testimony simply is the spokesperson’s testimony, and thus the epistemic 
significance of the group’s testimony just is the epistemic significance of the individual 
testimony.  Of course, the epistemic significance of the spokesperson’s statement – whether it 
is reliable, for example – will depend in large part upon the way in which the content of the 
11 
 
statement was generated by the group and provided to her.  But, as Lackey points out, this is 
often true for individual testimony too.  The epistemic significance of what I say to you in my 
personal capacity depends in large part upon the epistemic standing of the people from whom 
I acquired my ‘information’.   
 
Suppose we accept Lackey’s deflationary account of the epistemic significance of group 
testimony.  Does this mean that group trustworthiness in testimony is to be identified with the 
individual trustworthiness of the spokesperson?  No: the spokesperson is not making an 
assertion, and does not undertake responsibility for the truth of what she says.  The 
spokesperson is not like an embedded journalist: she does not, in general, make an assertion 
about the group.  Instead, she speaks on behalf of the group, about the relevant subject 
matter.  This distinction between reporting views and expressing them is familiar from 
ordinary individual assertions: in saying that p, I do not report that I believe that p, but 
instead I purport to express my belief that p.  In making my assertion, I undertake 
responsibility for the truth of p, not merely for the truth of the claim that I believe that p. 
 
Does the spokesperson undertake responsibility for the truth of what she says on behalf of the 
group?  No.  Her responsibility is to execute her duties as a spokesperson, and we can judge 
her as trustworthy or untrustworthy in that capacity, but this is not to judge her 
trustworthiness as an assertor, even in this circumscribed setting.   Indeed, Lackey’s view is 
that the spokesperson is not governed by standard norms of assertion, but rather by norms 
specific to her status as spokesperson (Lackey, forthcoming).  So although there is a sense in 
which what the spokesperson says is what the group says, this does not mean that the 
spokesperson makes an assertion which is the group’s assertion.   
 
We can judge the spokesperson as reliable or unreliable with regard to the truth in this matter 
– and Lackey may well be correct about the epistemic significance of what the spokesperson 
says – but this is not to evaluate the spokesperson’s trustworthiness with regard to this subject 
matter.  If any entity is taking responsibility for the truth of what is said, it is the group rather 
than the spokesperson.   
 
Does the group take responsibility for what is said on its behalf?  One approach to this 
question would be to take up general issues about collective responsibility, to understand first 
what it is for a group to be responsible for something, then what it is for a group to take 
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responsibility, and specifically to take responsibility for the truth of a statement.  But I will 
adopt a different approach, asking not what it would be for a group to take responsibility for 
the truth of what is said, but whether we can manage without that notion: what costs would 
we incur if we did not think of groups in this way?   
 
We saw in the individual case that the distinctions between trust and reliance, and between 
trustworthiness and reliability, seem to be of central importance in our dealings with one 
another.  The notion of reliance doesn’t seem sufficient to account for our interpersonal 
interactions and attitudes.  But what about the group case: can we manage without the notions 
of group trustworthiness, group responsibility for the truth, and group assertion?  I will 
investigate this by looking first at the epistemic aspects of group testimony, and then at the 
ethical aspects of group testimony.  I will argue that in each case we can vindicate our 
practices without resort to a distinction between trustworthiness and reliability; this does not 
settle the question of whether groups can be trustworthy, but it does shift the burden of proof.   
 
7. Group Trustworthiness in Testimony: Epistemic Aspects 
A number of authors, including Hinchman (2005), Moran (2006), McMyler (2007) and 
Faulkner (2011) have argued that trust, as opposed to mere reliance, plays an important role 
in the epistemic significance of individual testimony.  There are significant differences 
amongst these various authors, but some common themes emerge.  On this picture, the 
speaker’s undertaking of responsibility for what is said provides the intended audience with a 
distinctive epistemic reason to believe what is said.  Conversely, the audience’s trust, not 
mere reliance, in the speaker plays a key role in justifying beliefs acquired through testimony. 
The speaker offers his or her assurance to the audience, and, when circumstances are 
favourable, this assurance gives the audience reason to trust and reason to believe.   
 
If assurance plays a key epistemic role in our acquisition of knowledge from testimony, then 
so does the trust-reliance distinction, and thus also the trustworthiness-reliability distinction.  
When we learn from what someone tells us, complete with assurance, we regard her as 
trustworthy in this matter.  According to the assurance view, we are then in a better epistemic 
position than when we merely learn from someone’s verbal behaviour, regarding her as 




Thus an assurance account of the epistemic significance of group testimony offers the best 
prospect for vindicating a trustworthiness-reliability distinction in that domain. Assurance 
accounts of individual testimony emerged in reaction to more standard views, and they have 
been criticised on various counts (e.g. Lackey 2008); I will not try to adjudicate this debate in 
the individual case. Rather, I will explore what non-assurance and assurance accounts of the 
epistemic significance of group testimony might look like, before arguing that assurance 
accounts are less motivated in the group case than in the individual case.   
 
In her (2007), Deborah Tollefsen advocates a non-assurance reductionism about the 
justification of the beliefs we form on the basis of group testimony.  Such beliefs are justified 
insofar as we can monitor the reliability of the group’s testimony more generally; the view is 
reductionist in that the justification of testimonial beliefs is reducible to justification gained 
from other sources. On this view, group pronouncements are treated as just more evidence, in 
the mix with group behaviours and features of all sorts; there is no epistemic role here for 
group trustworthiness over and above group reliability.  Similarly, Lackey’s identification of 
group testimony with spokesperson testimony allows us to assess the epistemic merits of 
group testimony by assessing the testimony of the spokesperson.  Lackey herself adopts a 
non-assurance view of the epistemic significance of individual testimony (2008), meaning 
that, on this view, there is no epistemic role for assurance in group testimony.   
 
What would an assurance account of the epistemic significance of group testimony look like?   
In a later paper, Tollefsen advocates a more demanding notion of what it is for a group to 
testify:  ‘…the fact that groups issue intelligible statements either in writing or via a 
spokesperson seems to me now not sufficient to say that they, themselves, are testifiers.’ 
(2011: 12)  Tollefsen turns to assurance accounts, seeing testimony as essentially 
interpersonal, ‘deeply tied to epistemic responsibility’ (15).  For groups to testify, on this 
picture, they must be able to acknowledge their epistemic responsibilities; this echoes the 
connections I have highlighted between trustworthiness and fulfilling responsibilities.  
 
One of Tollefsen’s real-life examples involves a panel of scientists, tasked to issue a 
definitive statement about the genetic hazards of radiation.  Although the scientists had 
underlying disagreements about the facts, Tollefsen argues that ‘group members realized the 
fact that others were depending on the group to speak its mind and that they had a 
responsibility to say something definitive and take collective responsibility for what was said’ 
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(2011: 17).  It is striking that Tollefsen refers to the individual group members as 
acknowledging responsibility for getting the group as a whole to take responsibility for what 
is said. 
 
Miranda Fricker (2012) asks what is required for a group to be able to offer assurance in its 
testimony, and suggests that ‘any group partly constituted by way of a joint commitment to 
trustworthiness (regarding some relevant range of questions) is pre-eminently suited to enter 
into the second-personal relations of trust that characterize testimony.’ (272)  The notion of 
joint commitment here is based on that developed by Margaret Gilbert across many works 
(e.g. her 2006).  According to Fricker, group members make – initially to one another – 
commitments to be jointly trustworthy. The resulting joint commitment helps constitute a 
group which can then itself offer assurance to its audience. Much like Tollefsen, Fricker gives 
a key role to individual commitments, within the collective context, in generating assurance 
on behalf of the group.   
 
Fricker’s picture has a certain appeal when we think about the ‘good’ cases, in which well-
intentioned people get together in the hope of forming a trustworthy group.  Fricker shows 
how it can accommodate cases in which such a groups becomes untrustworthy because 
members do not fulfil their commitments to joint trustworthiness, perhaps because of 
personal corruption.   
 
However other sorts of cases do not fit so well.  Imagine a nefarious group, formed by 
members who make a mutual commitment to jointly deceive the public (insert your own 
example here).  Such groups are constituted by the individuals’ commitments to deception, 
not by joint commitments to trustworthiness, so do not fall under Fricker’s account. Are these 
groups ‘suited to enter into the second-personal relations of trust that characterize testimony’?  
Not if we construe the question literally: nobody should trust such groups. But if some groups 
are trustworthy, then surely these nefarious groups qualify as untrustworthy, not merely 
unreliable (Lackey makes a related point in her draft ‘Group Lies’, fn.9).  Such groups seem 
as suited to enter into second-personal relations of distrust, resentment, and betrayal, as more 
admirable groups are suited to enter into second-personal relations of trust.  
 
Moreover Fricker’s account does not allow for the possibility of trustworthy organisations 
whose members – for example, employees – follow appropriate procedures, but are not 
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motivated by a desire for or commitment to group trustworthiness.  Perhaps Fricker would be 
happy to conclude that such a group does not produce genuinely assurance-based testimony, 
but is in practice more similar to a information-producing machine, or a source of 
information, rather than an informant, in the terms she shares with Craig (1990). 
 
Despite these concerns, some groups do seem to operate in the ways Fricker describes. But 
what is the epistemic significance of this?  Fricker herself argues that, in the individual case, 
assurance provides a different, but not essentially stronger reason to believe what is said than 
does merely overheard testimony.  She writes that: 
an addressee [who receives assurance] and an eavesdropper [who does not] could 
have exactly the same background reasons to trust [an individual] testifier’s word; but 
that in telling his addressee that p a testifier offers her a second-personal trust based 
reason to believe his word that p; whereas he (wittingly or unwittingly) offers the 
eavesdropper a third-personal trust based reason to believe that p. These are both 
epistemic reasons, for they both bear on the likely truth of p, and they may deliver the 
same strength of warrant; but I have tried to vindicate the idea that they are subtly 
different sorts of epistemic reason. (268-9)   
Less sympathetically, Lackey (2008: 249) suggests that the difference between trust and 
reliance ‘may very well be psychologically, morally, or even pragmatically relevant’, whilst 
denying that it has epistemic significance. 
 
One can recognise the significance of assurance and trustworthiness in the individual case 
without downgrading the epistemic significance of the ways in which we can learn from 
others’ words without being mediated by assurance.  Moreover, the various considerations 
which may make assurance views of epistemic significance attractive in the individual case 
do not easily transfer to the group case.   
 
For example, Moran argues that the fact that individual speakers freely choose what to say is 
what makes testimony epistemically valuable to the audience, indeed more valuable than a 
hypothetical opportunity to directly inspect the speaker’s beliefs.  But this is puzzling given a 
non-assurance view of testimony which regards speech as mere evidence of the speaker’s 
beliefs: 
If speech is seen as a form of evidence [of the speaker’s beliefs], then once its 
intentional character is recognized (that is, not just as intentional behavior, but 
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intentional with respect to inducing a particular belief) we need an account of how it 
could count as anything more than doctored evidence (2006: 278).   
On the assurance account, argues Moran, the fact that the speaker opts to ‘stand behind’ her 
words, actively offering them as reasons to believe, is an advantage, not a disadvantage to the 
audience.  (Keren 2012 challenges Moran on this front.) 
 
The analogous ideas are much less compelling in the group case.  First, it is not obvious that 
non-assurance accounts of the epistemic significance of group statements must see them as 
evidence of group belief, especially since the very notion of group belief is disputed.  Second, 
group statements do not obviously have the status of freely-chosen words, in any relevant 
sense. Instead, we can see groups as producing statements via the functioning of various 
internal mechanisms; we may then consider whether those mechanisms lend themselves to 
the production of truth or false statements.  Nonassurance accounts of group testimony are 
not challenged by the considerations Moran raises for the individual case. 
 
Advocates of assurance-style accounts of individual testimony sometimes lean on ideas about 
respect for others as interlocutors.  For example Fricker (2007, chapter 6) argues that, under 
some circumstances, regarding others as mere sources of information rather than as 
informants involves an ethically dubious brand of objectification.  And Hinchman (2005) 
motivates his account with reference to the insulting ‘slights’ and ‘rebuffs’ we create when 
we do not accept what we are told.  But these considerations bear much less weight in group 
cases: objectifying group testifiers is problematic or insulting only to the extent that it in fact 
amounts to objectifying or insulting individual members of the group, perhaps on the basis of 
their group membership.     
 
Tollefsen (2007) argues that  Burge-style anti-reductionism about the epistemology of 
testimony does not fit well with group statements: there is no default of accepting what 
groups say, in the absence of evidence of their reliability.  Tollefsen sees this as favouring a 
reductionist rather than an anti-reductionist approach to the evidence offered by testimony, 
considering an assurance view only in her later work. But I think similar considerations tell 
against an assurance account of group testimony: even if we needed the epistemic boost 
provided by assurance to get the practice of testimony going in the first place, the resources 
thereby provided through individual testimony seem sufficient to underpin an evidential 




To summarise: we can acknowledge the epistemic significance of group testimony without 
requiring a notion of group assurance, responsibility or trustworthiness; moreover, the 
arguments used to motivate assurance accounts of the epistemic significance of individual 
testimony do not easily transfer to the group case.  This does not demonstrate that assurance 
views are false in the group case, but it does place a heavy burden of proof upon their 
supporters, over and above the burden of proving the strength of assurance accounts in the 
individual case.   
 
 
8. Group Trustworthiness in Testimony: Ethical Aspects 
I have argued that we do not need the distinction between group trustworthiness and mere 
group reliability in order to make sense of our epistemic practices around group testimony.  
What about our ethical practices?  The epistemic significance of assurance is contentious 
even in the individual case.  But no-one doubts the ethical significance of trustworthiness for 
individuals; lying is a paradigmatic untrustworthy act, with paradigmatic ethical significance, 
and reckless testimony which pays no regard to truth or falsity is likewise ethically culpable.  
So it might seem that, if we could not attribute lies (as opposed to mere false statements) to a 
group, nor regard groups as either trustworthy or untrustworthy, then we would lose an 
important aspect of accountability both in law and in morals.   
 
The issue of corporate or collective moral responsibility is complex and contested (e.g. Isaacs 
2011; van de Poel, Ryakkers, and Zwart 2015), and I cannot hope to engage it here in any 
depth.  Instead, I will focus on an issue which emerges more directly from the literature on 
trust and trustworthiness: reactive attitudes.  Following Baier, philosophers distinguish trust 
and reliance as directed at individuals because of the intimate connections between trust and 
certain reactive attitudes, connections which are missing in the case of reliance.  And 
certainly some of us seem ready to react to groups and organisations with attitudes like 
loyalty, gratitude, resentment, and a sense of betrayal.  If groups are not genuinely 
trustworthy or untrustworthy with regard to their testimony, merely reliable or unreliable, 
then such reactions would seem to be mistaken.   
 
I think many of us do direct trust-and-distrust-related reactive attitudes towards groups, and 
that these are indeed misplaced if groups can be neither trustworthy or untrustworthy 
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(Thompson forthcoming discusses reactive attitudes in connection with groups). 
Nevertheless, there are two related reactions which can be appropriate, even without group 
trustworthiness or untrustworthiness.  First: individual people are liable to praise and blame, 
gratitude and resentment, for their personal trustworthiness and untrustworthiness in helping 
generate group statements.  Second: it is appropriate to react positively (negatively) to living 
in a society in which important groups and institutions are reliable (unreliable) producers of 
true statements.  I will examine these ideas in turn. 
 
Imagine a situation in which a number of people undertake to help ensure that a group issues 
reliable statements.  This may include members of the group, who can fill different roles in 
their organisation, but may also include non-members, for example people who founded or 
designed the group, or people now tasked with regulating or overseeing its activities. Such 
individuals may be more or less trustworthy in playing their various roles, and can sensibly 
be judged, praised, or resented for their actions in that capacity.   
 
This picture is reminiscent of Fricker’s joint commitment account of group assurance, but I 
draw different conclusions from it.  Each individual takes responsibility for helping ensure 
that the group produces a true statement, but in line with my arguments of the previous 
section, none need take responsibility for the truth of the group’s statement in the way 
required for assertion, and nor does the group itself take such responsibility.  Even if we 
endorse a Williamsonian knowledge norm on assertion, for example, we need see nothing 
problematic in a situation where none of the group members knows the truth of the group’s 
statement.  On this picture, a group statement is like a reading provided by a complex 
machine: we can hold the designers, operators, and maintainers responsible for ensuring that 
the machine provides accurate readings, without regarding any individual as asserting the 
content of the reading. 
 
So reactive attitudes connected to ‘trusting’ a group can sensibly be directed at individuals 
connected to the group.  But is this really feasible where the audience does not know who 
these individuals are?  Yes: you easily resent the person, whoever it was, who wrote graffiti 
on your front door, and your feelings are quite different about the wind which inconveniently 
blew litter into your garden.  Likewise, you can resent the individuals who contributed to the 




So far, I have focused on situations in which we can regard individuals as trustworthy to the 
extent that they help ensure the reliability of a group’s statements.  But, as I suggested in 
response to Fricker, other situations do not fit this pattern.  There could be situations in which 
the activity of various people leads to a reliable group ‘statement’, although the individuals 
themselves are merely reliable or unreliable, rather than trustworthy or untrustworthy. 
Perhaps the ‘wisdom of crowds’ cases are like this, at least where crowd members have no 
particular responsibility to be careful or accurate.  But, appropriately, if we appreciate that we 
face such a situation, we are not tempted to adopt reactive attitudes towards the crowd. 
 
Less innocuously, there seem to be situations in which individuals perform well in their roles 
exactly to the extent that a group produces unreliable statements, precisely because that is the 
group’s purpose.  Perhaps this true of a PR agency, a lobbying group, or a propaganda 
‘machine’.  It is natural for an audience to feel resentful if they discover the unreliability of 
their sources, yet there may be no individual who is untrustworthy in the sense of not doing 
her job properly.  Is this a situation in which we must either take up reactive attitudes towards 
the group itself, or else abandon the participant stance? 
 
No.  In many such circumstances, there are individuals who may legitimately be resented for 
creating or perpetuating an agency whose main function is to mislead.  Whether this involves 
a failure of trustworthiness, rather than some other sort of moral or political failure, may 
depend upon which detailed account of trust and trustworthiness we espouse, but reactive 
attitudes reach beyond the domain of trustworthiness and untrustworthiness in any case. 
 
In other circumstances, there may be no individual(s) to blame, and yet still it seems 
reasonable to feel resentful about societal structures: this is the kind of generalised 
resentment I alluded to above.  For example, we might well feel angry that we live in a 
society where many media outlets fail to provide us with reliable information, even supposing 
(implausibly) that there are no specific individuals who can be held accountable for this.  This 
raises large issues within political and social philosophy which I cannot explore here; a 
natural first step would be to use Iris Marion Young’s notion of ‘structural injustice’ (e.g. 
2011).  
 
I have suggested that we can retain much of our ethical practice around group testimony 
without needing to invoke notions of group trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, as 
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opposed to group reliability and unreliability.  But the connection with reactive attitudes was 
not the only ethical motivation for distinguishing trustworthiness and reliability in the 
individual case: I also suggested that the former, unlike the latter, is a candidate virtue.   
 
Fricker (2012), drawing on Lahroodi (2007), offers an account of institutional epistemic 
virtues such as fair-mindedness.  She focuses primarily on the ways in which individuals, 
acting as members of collectives, can display virtue and vice.  She also discusses virtue and 
vice in institutional structures, arguing that an institution in isolation cannot be virtuous or 
vicious, only as it is populated by individual people.  Responding to Fricker’s earlier (2007), 
Elizabeth Anderson emphasises the need for structural remedies to testimonial injustice, over 
and above remedies involving individual action and cultivation of virtue.  She says ‘when the 
members of an organization jointly commit themselves to operating according to institutional 
principles that are designed to achieve testimonial justice…this is what it is for the 
organisation itself to be testimonially just’ (2012: 168-9).   
 
These are compelling thoughts: we need to address structural problems and collective 
contexts if we are to combat injustice and create better institutions.  However, we do not need 
the distinction between trustworthiness and mere reliability at the group level in order to 
pursue these projects. The distinction matters at the individual level precisely because we 
cannot always require others to be reliable in respects which matter to us.  I cannot require 
that you read all my published works (unless that’s you, Mum – hi!), and if you do not do so, 
then you are unreliable in that respect, but in no sense untrustworthy.  There is no general 
obligation upon individuals to be reliable, which is why we need the language of 
trustworthiness to highlight those particular respects in which individuals are obliged to be 
reliable.  But we can require of our institutions that they be reliable in the respects that matter 
to us, or at least we can require this of our public institutions.     
 
9. Trustworthiness and Group Action 
I have focused on trustworthiness and reliability in the context of group testimony, arguing 
that we can abandon the former notion without incurring significant costs.  Does the same go 
for trustworthiness in the context of group action?  Some of the issues I considered – for 
example the connections between trustworthiness, epistemic responsibility, and assertion – 
seem specific to the case of testimony, so the transition will not be seamless.  Matters are 
complicated by the fact that, even in the individual case, different philosophical accounts of 
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trust distinguish between trust and mere reliance in quite various ways: what it takes for an 
issue to become a question of trust may be to do with the perceived or actual motivations, 
interests, commitments, or obligations of the actor, according to different theories.   
 
But the ethical issues I discussed in the preceding section do seem to apply not just to the 
case of testimony but to group behaviour more generally.  The trust-reliance distinction is 
motivated by the connections between trust and certain reactive attitudes, and also through 
the moral significance of trustworthiness, over and above reliability.  I suggested above that 
although we do in fact direct trust-related reactive attitudes towards groups, with regard to 
their testimony as well as their actions more generally, we could more appropriately direct 
these towards individuals, known or unknown, group members or not, who are in various 
ways responsible for the functioning of the group.  To generalise this account, we would need 
to think carefully about what we can reasonably expect of group behaviour, and also about 
the ways in which individuals can be responsible through inaction, as well as through action. 
 
Moreover, there are significant differences in our thinking about trustworthiness in 
individuals and trustworthiness or reliability in groups.  Regarding an individual as 
trustworthy is typically caught up with respect for her as autonomous in some way: someone 
who reliably follows a benevolent despot’s orders under duress is not displaying her 
trustworthiness.  Trustworthy behaviour often, though not always, reflects a determination to 
fulfil obligations or commitments which were voluntarily acquired.  Likewise, it can be 
important to recognise when an individual’s behaviour is not a matter of trustworthiness or 
untrustworthiness: if the headteacher does not release the noisy children at noon, so I am not 
reminded to take my lunch break, I should recognise that she has not betrayed me in any way. 
  
Do we need to regard groups and organisations in the same way?  It may depend upon the 
group, its constitution and supposed purpose, including questions about whether an 
organisation is a element of the state or a private entity, and whether membership of a 
particular group is chosen or imposed.  To what extent do certain groups have obligations to 
individuals, or to other groups?  As these considerations indicate, issues of trustworthiness in 
group action quickly involve larger questions about collective responsibility and 
commitment; a fruitful line of inquiry would be to investigate whether or not these questions 




9.  Onwards and Outwards 
I have considered the question of whether we need a notion of group trustworthiness, over 
and above group reliability, in order to understand the epistemic and ethical significance of 
group testimony, and my tentative answer was ‘no’: reliability is all that we need.  Likewise, 
I suggested, we do not need this distinction in order to understand our attitudes to group 
behaviour more generally.  My discussion was not comprehensive, and I do not regard my 
arguments as conclusive.  Nevertheless, I have begun to cast doubt on the viability of the 
trustworthiness-reliability distinction as applied to groups. 
 
Suppose that in fact this distinction does no useful work.  Does this mean we should abandon 
talk of group trustworthiness?  Should we regard public and interdisciplinary discussion of 
organisational trustworthiness (e.g. Hawley 2012: chapter 8) as simply confused?  
 
At one level this is a strategic issue about choice of terminology, and about whether it is 
worth struggling to impose quasi-technical terms onto broader discourse.  A related issue 
arises even in the individual case.  As I noted earlier, although the trust-reliance distinction is 
rightly valued by philosophers discussing interpersonal trust, it is not consistently marked in 
ordinary language: we often talk of trusting or distrusting inanimate objects, for example, or 
indeed trusting someone to get things wrong.  One response is to change terminology.  
Instead of contrasting trust and reliance, we might follow Hollis (1998: 10) in distinguishing 
normative trust from predictive trust, or, as Faulkner (2007: 880) prefers, affective trust from 
predictive trust. Whilst these choices may have independent philosophical merit, they do not 
help us avoid jargon in the public realm. 
 
More substantively, whatever our terminology, if the trustworthiness-reliability distinction 
lacks merit in the group case – or, in other terms, if there is a type of trustworthiness which 
individuals but not groups can exemplify – then this is of significance to wider debates.  Even 
in the individual case, many public concerns about ‘trustworthiness’ are really about 
reliability, but they are pressing concerns nonetheless.   
 
Moreover, many public concerns about trust and groups are in fact best construed as 
(genuine, pressing) concerns about trusting individuals in a group context.  I have discussed 
some aspects of this above, in connection with individual responsibilities for group 
behaviour.  But in addition distrust or trust of an individual may be caused or rationalised by 
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beliefs about her group membership.  Fricker (2007) shows how such judgements can reflect 
ethically culpable prejudices, but not all group-based trust or distrust is problematic in this 
way.  Indeed, if we construe ‘group membership’ very loosely, almost any trust or distrust 
can be construed as group-based: I trust you because of your good track record, i.e. your 
membership of the group of people who have good track records.   
 
This notion of group membership may seem trivial, but other groups are more robustly 
unified: they are held together not just by some common feature of the members, but by 
informal or formal relations and structures within the group.  Such relations and structures 
may genuinely help to cause, promote or constitute the trustworthiness of group members in 
relevant domains, either by generating sanctions and rewards for individual members, or by 
enforcing trustworthiness-based entry barriers.  Professional self-regulatory bodies are 
supposed to fit this pattern: membership of the body indicates professional competence.  On 
the other hand, of course, groups may cause, promote, or indicate the untrustworthiness of 
individual members in certain respects, for example by creating incentives for members to 
put group loyalty above trustworthiness to non-members, or by reducing members’ 
competence in certain respects.   
 
The ways in which different group structures and identities can enhance or discourage 
individual trustworthiness in different domains are investigated empirically in organizational 
studies, and by social psychologists.  Consider peer pressure, or the variety of phenomena 
which could be studied under the heading of ‘institutional’ or ‘corporate’ culture or climate.  
For example, such local cultures can influence which respects of trustworthiness are seen as 
most important.  Is it a priority to defend your team, or the company, or to ‘champion’ the 
client, or blow the whistle where necessary?  It is easy to get into a situation where the 
demands of trustworthiness point in different directions, and different cultures may indicate 
different resolutions of such dilemmas.  Another dimension of variety may be the importance 
placed upon individual trustworthiness as opposed to other virtues or goals.   
 
Finally, although I have distinguished our attitudes to groups from our attitudes to individuals 
in group contexts, this distinction is not always sharply marked in practice.  We often interact 
with individuals as members, leaders, spokespersons, or representatives of groups, and we 
may do so with varying degrees of trust.  But it can then be indeterminate whether our 
attitude of (dis)trust targets the individual, the group, or both; if both, there is a further 
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question as to which comes first, epistemically speaking.  Do I trust the customer services 
representative because I have found the company to be reliable, or does my relationship with 
the individual come first?  There will of course be no single answer to such questions.  In 
fact, this gives us another good reason to start with the notion of trustworthiness or reliability 
– what does it take for an individual or group to exhibit these features? – rather than with our 
often indistinct attitudes of trust and distrust, reliance and nonreliance.   
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